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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PRESCRIPTION
Winston R. Day*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Boundary Prescription
Since there is no question that "title prescription may be pled in
boundary actions, and boundary prescriptions in title suits," I it becomes all
the more important to establish the appropriate relationship between the
Civil Code articles concerning boundaries and those pertaining to prescrip-
tion. Although the proper interpretation of article 853 has plagued Louisiana
courts for a number of years, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Prather v.
Valien2 declined an opportunity to re-examine the conflicting jurisprudence
and reached a proper conclusion on narrow grounds. Some of the language
used by the court in the decision, however, implies that an informal
agreement establishing a visible but incorrect boundary between adjoining
landowners may result in acquisition of part of the area by one of the
owners. By its terms, article 853 provides that boundaries incorrectly
established by a surveyor may not be rectified after ten years if the parties
are present or twenty years if absent. A series of Louisiana cases, 3 however,
has suggested that "active acquiescence" in an incorrect visible boundary
by an adjacent landowner may result in loss of ownership. In Prather, the
court found an absence of such acquiescence and seemed to place a stringent
burden upon what would be necessary to establish it. Although the case was
correctly decided, it is unfortunate that the court felt compelled, in light of
the jurisprudence, to negate the possibility of active acquiescence.
Although the doctrine of boundary acquiescence is well established in
many common law jurisdictions,' it is based on the conceptual nature of
adverse possession in the common law as a statute of limitation on actions
for recovery of land 5 and does not seem supported by the theory or language
of the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 853 creates a very narrow exception to
the general rules of acquisitive prescription by allowing one to acquire a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Ledoux v. Waterbury, 292 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. 1974).
2. 327 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
3. See, e.g., Huval v. Dupuis, 302 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) and cases
cited therein.
4. See, for example, the extended discussion in Boyle v. D-XSunray Oil Co.,
191 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Iowa 1961) and cases cited therein.
5. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.1-.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
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portion of adjoining property in less than thirty years without the necessity
of showing good faith or just title. Under the scheme of article 853, the
survey is a reasonable substitute for these elements. Since the article
involves a mode of acquiring immovable property, it should be strictly
interpreted, and the broad interpretation suggested by the cases creates an
additional method of acquisition of an immovable dehors the public record,
but without the usual requirements of prescription. Furthermore, the cases
have failed to examine the effect of the 1968 amendment to article 833.
Although the article previously limited the extra-judicial fixing of boun-
daries to those licensed to survey, it was amended in 1968 to provide that:
Any written agreement, heretofore or hereafter made, which desig-
nates or delimits all or part of a boundary between two or more estates
is binding upon all parties thereto who are sui juris, their heirs,
successors and assigns, to the same extent as any other written
agreement affecting immovable property.
Although the proper interpretation of the amendment raises interesting
questions,6 it certainly seems to create the exclusive method of delimiting
boundaries by agreement and in the absence of a surveyor. Any other mode
of acquiring immovables by the passage of time should be accompanied by
the rigorous requirements of ordinary prescription.
Servitudes-Acquisition by Prescription
In the landmark decision of Nash v. Whitten,' the Louisiana Supreme
Court re-examined the inconsistent jurisprudence pertaining to the classifi-
cation of servitudes as continuous or discontinuous. Since the decision is
treated fully by Professor Yiannopoulos elsewhere in this symposium,8 the
writer will refrain from discussion except to express support for Justice
Tate's forceful argument that "functional and practical values" should
always be an important factor in interpreting the Louisiana Civil Code.
Civilian principles and methodology will be strengthened by continuous
6. For example, does the phrase "to the same extent as any other written
agreement affecting immovable property" mean that the agreement must be re-
corded to affect subsequent purchasers? See LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950). An additional
question could be raised as to whether a written agreement which incorrectly delimits
the boundary is immediately unassailable or precludes rectification only after the
accrual of liberative prescription of ten years. Certainly it appears that the intent of
the amendment was to make such agreements immediately binding and acquisitive
prescription and article 853 would be immaterial.
7. 326 So. 2d 856 (La. 1976).
8. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Property, 37 LA. L. REV. 317, 327-28 (1977).
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cognizance that the Civil Code must serve contemporary Louisiana society
with its unique historical and cultural heritage. The requirement that a
servitude be continuous in order to be the subject of acquisitive prescription
serves a very limited purpose and Civil Code article 727 is certainly
susceptible to differing interpretations. 9 In such an event it is entirely
appropriate to adopt that interpretation most functional for our legal system
regardless of the views of French commentators.
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Redhibitory Actions
Although several cases during the past term dealt correctly with the
problem of prescription on redhibitory actions, the decision in Weaver v.
Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc. '0 contains troublesome language that
may well cause future problems. More than a year after a sale, suit was
brought against both the vendor and manufacturer to rescind the sale of
mobile homes alleged to contain numerous defects. In rejecting the manu-
facturer's claim of prescription, the court stated broadly that the one year
prescriptive period provided by Civil Code article 2534"1 never commenced
to run against the manufacturer who failed to declare to the purchaser the
defects in the product, since the manufacturer was presumed to have
knowledge of such defects. The court's acceptance of the notion that the
manufacturer 2 as well as the vendor may be sued under article 2534 is to be
commended. Further, the decision reached a correct result, since the court
might have rejected the manufacturer's prescription plea as it did that of the
vendor on the basis that neither vendor nor manufacturer had abandoned
attempts to repair. However, the suggestion that prescription may never
commence to run against a manufacturer because of his presumed knowl-
edge of the defect is unfortunate and could lead to further difficulty in
determining the precise nature of redhibitory rights vis- -vis manufacturers
and vendors. Civil Code articles 2545 and 2546 provide that in the special
9. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. I (1968).
10. 327 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
II. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2534 provides:
The redhibitory action must be instituted within a year, at the farthest, com-
mencing from the date of the sale.
This limitation does not apply where the seller had knowledge of the vice and
neglected to declare it to the purchaser.
12. For a full treatment of the conceptual nature of the purchaser's right, see
Professor Litvinoff's discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1973-1974 Term-Sales, 35 LA. L. REv. 310 (1975).
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case in which the seller knows the defect and fails to disclose, prescription
commences upon discovery of the vice 13 and the facts of Weaver clearly
indicate such discovery.
The most interesting aspect of the Weaver case is the very fact that the
court viewed the prescriptive pleas of the vendor and manufacturer as
separate and distinct items. Since the suit was clearly brought in contract
rather than tort, the court's treatment suggests that the responsibility of the
vendor and manufacturer are not based on identical grounds in such an
event. If, as suggested by Professor Litvinoff, 4 the purchaser's redhibitory
rights against the manufacturer are based on a notion of subrogation of the
purchaser to the rights of his vendor, a number of interesting problems of
prescription will be encountered in the future. It can be readily seen, for
example, that where a purchaser discovers a defect more than a year after a
sale, prescription may have run against the vendor, but not against the
manufacturer who is charged with knowledge of the defects because of
spondet peritiam artis. Is Such a result would be consistent with the decision
of Breaux v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. , 6 in which the court differentiated
the position of vendor and that of the manufacturer as far as responsibility
for damages is concerned. A further problem will arise concerning the
identity of the discoverer needed to commence prescription. If the interven-
ing vendor discovers the defect more than a year before suit is brought
against the manufacturer will the purchaser's rights be lost, or will discov-
ery by the purchaser be required? 7 Furthermore, it is not unlikely that
following discovery of a vice by a purchaser, the vendor will make
considerable effort to repair, perhaps extending beyond a year. Will the
purchaser's rights against the manufacturer have prescribed? It would seem
that in each case subrogation principles would limit the purchaser to the
rights of his vendor and those rights may well have been lost by prescription.
13. Several cases during the past term correctly applied these articles. See, e.g.,
Christy-Ann-Lea, Inc. v. Charter Homes of Louisiana, Inc., 327 So. 2d 569 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1976).
14. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Sales,
35 LA. L. REV. 310 (1975).
15. Id. at 312, n.13.
16. 282 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
17. To require that the purchaser discover the defect for prescription to com-
mence would have the effect of prolonging the manufacturer's exposure each time
the product is sold.
